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View Over the Balkan Peninsula
Поглед над Балканите

GRAND VIZIER KÖPRÜLÜ MEHMED PASHA'S FORTIFICATIONS ALONG THE NORTHERN BLACK SEA COAST

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Abstract. Ottoman historiography has focused on the construction activity of the Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha with reference to the castles he got built in Western Anatolia. Nevertheless, his endeavours to fortify the Black Sea coasts of the Ottoman Empire attracted less attention. This study seeks to describe and clarify Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's defensive construction projects against Cossack naval raids in two separate zones of the Northern Black Sea: the Don and the Dnieper. This study relies on contemporary European reports, Ottoman archival material and related literature. It suggests that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha reinforced the protection of the Don estuary by commissioning the construction of a castle (Sedd-i İslam) on the one hand, and two self-standing towers on the other in 1660. As for the Dnieper, the pasha commanded the Doğançeçidi Castle's construction in 1661, which was completed in 1662. Highlighting this dynamic building activity, the present essay suggests that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's invigoration of the northern frontiers of the Ottoman Empire should not be overshadowed by the conquests he is rather associated with.

Keywords: Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (1656 – 1661); Ottoman frontiers; the Black Sea; Cossacks; Sedd-i İslam, Liutik; Doğançeçidi

Introduction

In modern Ottoman historiography, Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's (1656 – 1661) policy of fortifying coastal areas in Anatolia is well-known. *Seddülbahir* and *Sultaniye (Kumkale)* Castles in the Dardanelles and the *Sancakburnu* Castle in Izmir were, however, solely a portion of the pasha's construction project (Thys-Şenocak 2009, pp. 131 – 133; Gökpinar 2022, pp. 1176 – 1177), eclipsing his less celebrated fortification activities in the Black Sea. Around half a century ago, Metin Kunt was probably the first in modern literature to refer in his doctoral dissertation to a castle built under the pasha's authority on the Dnieper. This so-called *Sedd-i İslam* (castle of Islam), Kunt claimed, was completed in 1660 (Kunt 1971, p. 126). Preliminary research would, however, suggest that the Sedd-i İslam Castle was unfortunately not on the Dnieper, but

rather on the Don¹. In any case, Kunt's reference to that effect gives us a clue regarding the pasha's concerns about, and policy related to, the Black Sea.

In order to draw attention to the construction activities of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha in a due manner, it might be necessary to evaluate the precarious nature of the Ottoman presence in the Black Sea basin. Victor Ostapchuk pointed out years ago that the Black Sea could hardly be regarded as an Ottoman lake strictly speaking, because the Cossack raids constantly put the Ottoman settlements in jeopardy (Ostapchuk 1987). Peter Bartl noted that the Cossacks, who descended from the Don and Dnieper Rivers to the Black Sea with their small and highly mobile boats (*shayka*), made effective raids against Istanbul as late as 1660 (i.e., during Köprülü Mehmed's term in office) to disrupt the grain supply to the Ottoman capital (Bartl 1998, p. 305).

It was especially during the first half of the 17th century that such raids rendered life very hard in the Ottoman Empire's Black Sea coasts. Both the Crimean shores and the Anatolian coastal settlements were hard hit throughout the half-century. Posing an ever-growing threat, the attacks on Sinop in 1614 were followed by those on Trabzon and eventually the outskirts of Istanbul in 1624 (Berindei 1977; Öztürk 2004, pp. 53 – 54; Davies 2007, pp. 29 – 32). The apex of these raids was the Cossack occupation of Azov in 1637 which lasted for five years until the Ottoman recuperation of this strategic outpost (Yüksel 2011). In a way, the safety of the Black Sea shores was a continuous cause of concern for top-ranking decision-makers in the Ottoman capital as much before Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's incumbency as during his grand vizierate.

To draw a more vivid picture during Köprülü Mehmed's term in office, one can directly refer to contemporary accounts. In a newsletter from Venice dated August 4, 1657, it was stated that Cossack boats appeared off the coast of Istanbul. It was also commented that in those days when the struggle against Venice by land and sea in the Mediterranean continued, the Ottoman administration was worried about how to best protect itself². The Dutch representative in Istanbul, Levinus Warner, gave the following information about this summer in detail: Cossack bandits under the auspices of Moscow (i.e., the Don Cossacks) looted a large area along the Black Sea coast, plundering numerous villages and towns. Accordingly, not only the Tatars had to recruit extra soldiers but also the Ottomans were obliged to send soldiers from Istanbul to the area. In addition, the ships sailing from Istanbul to the Black Sea were larger and better armed compared to previous years. The reason why the Ottomans attached so much importance to the Black Sea issue was that it (which Warner referred to only as "those sides") functioned as the granary of Istanbul³.

The next summer (1658), some 50 Cossack boats that had reputedly descended to the sea were putting the Ottoman presence in the Black Sea at risk⁴. In the autumn of 1659, the Dutch representative Warner reported that Cossacks had been active in the sea again, taking hold of many vessels en route to Istanbul and to Trabzon, and pillaging coastal settlements⁵. To summarise, every summer after Köprülü Mehmed came to power in 1656, the Black Sea coast was hit by Cossack raiders.

The passages above point out that the Cossack problem is an important issue in the middle of the seventeenth century. As Alan Fisher drew attention, the imperial capital relied on provisions from Kefe (Caffa) and Azak (Azov) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially on wheat and rye. As a matter of fact, any naval activity of banditry between Azov and Istanbul turned Istanbul's food supply into a serious problem (Fisher 1973, p. 164). Hence, the fact that these Black Sea routes (which served as an alternative for the provisioning of Istanbul during the fight against Venice in the Mediterranean) were also undermined by the Cossack threat was probably bothering Köprülü Mehmed Pasha a lot.

In the face of such alarming developments, Mehmed Pasha seems to have undertaken construction activities on the northern shore of the Black Sea. The letter of the Dutch ambassador dated 9 November (30 October) 1660 informing that the construction of two new castles in the Dardanelles had been completed, included the following interesting detail right in the subsequent sentence: the construction of the fortifications that the pasha had ordered on the Don River had come to an end. The Crimean Khan had declared in the news he had formerly dispatched to the Porte, the letter continued, that these fortifications would come into operation in October 1660. According to the report, these fortifications would not only help stop the Cossack plunders in the Don region, but would also enable the Crimean Tatars to attack the enemy without fear⁶. Apart from these, there is no information related to the location or name of the fortifications.



Figure 1. Black Sea Basin in the Seventeenth Century
Source: Ostapchuk 1989, p. viii

1. Castle of Sedd-i İslam

The Dutch embassy's above-mentioned report in November 1660 was referring to the Don River. Literature highlighting Cossack activity provides us with in-depth knowledge relating to Ottoman construction activities. It suggests that in the spring 1660, 35 galleys loaded with stone and timber were sent by the Porte to Azov for the construction of new fortifications, which started in August 1660 on the Don. The Crimean Khan (Mehmed Giray) was himself in charge of running the operations, indeed (Chesnok 1988, p. 67). And the building activity pre-empted an already ongoing attack of the Don Cossacks as the khan himself claimed in a letter to the Russian Tsar in April 1661⁷. Hence these fortifications to close the passage of the Don Cossacks into the Black Sea through the Sea of Azov were a necessity.

The fortifications, to be more precise, were a network blocking the outlets into the Sea of Azov. The main castle called *Sedd-i İslam* (meaning the Dam of Islam) was on a branch of the Don River, called Reka Mortvyy Donets (the Dead Donets River), and the Russian name for the castle is Liutik as one can come across in academic literature, located between modern Nedvigovka and Hapry (Chesnok 1988). The castle was a stone quadrangular structure (39 X 40 M.) with four towers (Gusach 2015, p. 512). Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi, who went past the castle a few years after its construction, remarked that Sedd-i İslam was situated on a marshy ground on one among numerous islands at the mouth of the river (Evliya Çelebi 2014, p. 186b[v])⁸.




Figure 2. Azov in an Eighteenth Century Map
Source: Gusach 2015, p. 521

In addition to this main castle, there were also two separate towers (*Sultaniye* and *Şahi*) on the Don proper, placed on both sides of a ford (Chesnok 1988, p. 68), reciprocally blocking the exit of the Cossack vessels into the Sea of Azov. These two towers were located upstream, above the better-known Azov Castle. So there was considerable distance between the Sedd-i İslam Castle and these two towers, making sure that these new constructions controlled both the Dead Donets and the Don proper. The *Şahi* tower, as Evliya Çelebi informed us, was a round building with a perimeter of ca. 68 meters (150 steps) and a height of about 35 meters (Evliya Çelebi 2014, p. 186b[v])⁹. For the *Sultaniye* tower, Çelebi noted that the structure was high, made of stone and had a round shape. Between the *Şahi* and the *Sultaniye* towers, three layers of iron chains (each as thick as an arm) were stretched over the Don River, making it impossible for the Cossack boats to pass, as Çelebi reported (Evliya Çelebi 2014, p. 187a[r]).

After completing the construction, the Crimean Khan reportedly left a total garrison force of eight hundred people: five hundred inside the Sedd-i İslam and three hundred in the two towers (Istoricheskoe Opisanie Zemli Voyska Donskogo 1903, p. 226). It is hard to say if the garrisons placed by the Khan had permanent status. In any case, the Ottoman administration ordered the governor of Kastamonu the very next year (June 1661) to gather his forces and proceed to Sedd-i İslam with three hundred men in order to reinforce the garrisons¹⁰. It is hard to pinpoint how much of the governor's troops remained in Sedd-i İslam over the long term, either.

A register corresponding to 1662/3 made it clear that the regular garrison in Sedd-i İslam was around 140 troops¹¹. Their total salary of 1511 *akçes* per day was met by the tax-farm of Istanbul's customs duties. And the equipment necessary for the maintenance of this new fortification (such as lead, 50 pieces of saws, 500 pieces of rope, 100 hammers, 300 large axes, and 1800 shovels etc.) was sent from Istanbul in October 1661¹². This might suggest that the new defence network in Azov depended heavily on the imperial center.

It can be summed up that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's measures around the Don reinforced the Azov defence line by adding the Sedd-i İslam Castle and the two towers of *Sultaniye* and *Şahi*. Thus, the pasha took a serious step in securing the provisioning of Istanbul and the security of the Northern Anatolian coast against the raids of the Don Cossacks. Nonetheless, the Don was not the only outlet where sea raiders could get to the Black Sea and ravage the Ottoman coasts.

2. Castle of Doğangeçidi

Having fortified the mouth of the Don, Köprülü Pasha administration turned its attention toward the other principal Cossack outlet into the Black Sea, namely the River Dnieper. Even though there was a number of fortifications at the mouth of the Dnieper (Özi/Oczakow Castles, Hasan Pasha Castle, Hasan Pasha Fortress and Kılburun), it was still necessary to secure the upper banks in order to ensure that the Zaporozhian Cossacks would not descend into the Black Sea. The plan to build

fortifications around the place called Doğangeçidi had already been brought forth by the Porte more than three decades earlier; but the operation toward that effect had not yielded fruit in 1627 (Ostapchuk 1989, p. 126 – 149). Now, after thirty-four years, the Ottomans must have felt resourceful enough to revive the project.

In March 1661, the princes of Walachia and Moldavia were sent orders to prepare five thousand workers, along with thousands of pieces of wood for the construction activity that would take place on the Dnieper River. The men and the material were to be shipped over (respectively) Akkerman and İbrail via maritime route to the construction site on the Dnieper (close to modern Beryslav in Kherson, Ukraine).¹³ And in June 1661 Süleyman Pasha, the governor-general of Özi, was informed that the princes of Walachia and Moldavia were spared from the campaign duty (in Hungary) for this affair, while the pasha was himself commanded to use his best efforts in managing the construction at Doğangeçidi¹⁴. The first central army troops were sent in the summer, too: the payment of the *cebeciyan-ı dergah-ı ali* (armorers of the Porte) soldiers starting with June 1661 points to the assignment of 83 troops to Doğangeçidi¹⁵.

In early July 1661, the princes of Walachia and Moldavia were each commanded to send 1,000 musketeers (*tüfenkçi*) to the construction site, too¹⁶. At the same time, they were reminded to send the necessary workers and timbers (in addition to the musketeers newly demanded), that is, three months after the first orders were dispatched¹⁷. Here one must pay attention to the possibility that the building activity was not proceeding according to the schedule the Porte had in mind. Because Süleyman Pasha, the governor-general of the Özi (Oczakow) Province, had already sent a letter to the Porte, excusing himself for the delay in beginning the construction: the required workers and timber had not yet arrived. The Porte's response was simply ordering the pasha and the Wallachian Prince to hasten the construction no matter what¹⁸ and sending the Moldavian Prince another command to transport the necessary material to the construction site in person (*bi'z-zat*)¹⁹.

The fortification activity along the Dnieper seems to have understandably attracted the attention of the Cossacks. A dispatch from Warsaw in October 1661 made the following note: “the Pasha of Silistria [i.e. the Governor General of Özi] erected this summer a fortification on the Dnieper bank by the command of the Turkish Emperor in the area of the Polish Kingdom without facing any obstruction. The pasha left two or three thousand men to defend the structure.” However, the report continued, the Cossack leader Ivan Sirko later put together a few thousand troops to attack Doğangeçidi²⁰. Later reports pointed out that the attack was disorganised and turned out to be a failure, causing only limited damage to the construction before the Cossack troops withdrew. In any case, the building activity had already taken a long way “in which”, observed the reporter, “the Ottomans were toiling with incredible speed.”²¹



Figure 3. Satellite View of Doğangeçidi's Location
Source: Bagro 2015, p. 63 and 280; Googlemaps

It is hard to find any reference to the attack on Doğangeçidi in the Ottoman sources. What mattered, in any case, for Ottoman politics at the time was that Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha passed away in the autumn. After the pasha died on 31 October 1661, he was succeeded by his son Fazıl Ahmed Pasha as the grand vizier (Bekar 2022, pp. 19 – 20). Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha seems to have continued his father's plan to fortify the Dnieper: while the year advanced, the Porte ordered Süleyman Pasha to choose either Akkerman or Özi as his winter quarters. But in any case, he was obliged to ensure the continuation of the construction of the Doğangeçidi Castle. Furthermore, the Porte now commanded the pasha to gather 300 armoured musketeers (*cebe tüfenkçi*) from among the large and small fief-holders (*züemâ* and *erbâb-ı timar*) of the *sancak* (county) of Silistria to serve in 1662.²²

It is hard to say if the construction activity continued amid the cold of winter. But in mid-March 1662, Süleyman Pasha of Silistria was now ordered to summon all the *alaybeys* (troop commanders), *züemâ*, *erbâb-i timar*, and other military personnel in the Özi Province to the construction area in order to build two towers below Dogangecidi, along the Dnieper.²³ Evliya Çelebi referred to these as “quite strong towers on the Dnieper, armed with large-calibre cannons (*balyemez*)” (Evliya Çelebi 2014, p. 110b[v])²⁴. It looks like this order was also observed by the Polish: it was reported from Warsaw in May 1662 that the Ottomans had taken up

the construction work again, and the Governor General of Özi was commanded to move to Doğangeçidi in order to assist the building activity²⁵.

It seems that the building activity continued over the year: in the summer 1662, Süleyman Pasha and other related officials received a command to transport timber and lime from Oczakow to Doğangeçidi²⁶. And it was probably the last command regarding the construction of the castle: around October 1662, Süleyman Pasha was honoured with two pieces of *hil'at* (robes of honour) for his services in the construction of the Doğangeçidi Castle²⁷. Hence, it can be assumed that the Doğangeçidi Castle must have been completed in about seventeen months after the Porte issued the first orders to the local governors.

Evliya Çelebi's travelogue informs us that Doğangeçidi Castle was a stone fortification, and it was also known as the Gâzîkirmân. The castle had an inner keep that was placed on a rock and protected by five towers. Strong walls were reaching from the inner keep down to the Dnieper River. The perimeter of this quadrangular structure was 1200 extended steps (ca. 540 meters). With its location right across the Crimean castle of Şahinkirmân, Doğangeçidi was intended to play an important role in securing the passage of the Tatars over the Dnieper (Evliya Çelebi 2014, p. 110b[v]-111a[r]).

Around the time the castle was noted by Evliya, the garrison force was 457 local troops. Even though the figures are not provided separately, the troop classes under arms were *mustahfizan* (infantry), *azeban* (infantry) and *farisan* (cavalry) inside the castle, along with the *topçuyan* (artillery) in both the castle and the towers. The daily amount of 7279 akçes spent for their salary was transferred from Isakçı (Isacea), Tulça (Tulcea) and Kili (Kilia)²⁸. Hence, the Özi Province itself was subsidising this new fortification.

Conclusion

The expectations from the new constructions on the northern Black Sea shore were high at first: as early as October 1661, it was suggested that the Ottomans started to feel secure against the Cossacks thanks to these fortifications²⁹. It later turned out that the effectivity of these newly erected fortifications, however, left much to be desired: Ottoman documentation dated to 1663 suggests that the Cossacks continued their raids via the Black Sea, putting Ottoman authorities on alert³⁰. The Dutch representative in Istanbul similarly made the following remark: in 1663, the Cossacks started a raid more vigorous than before³¹. It seems that the Cossacks found themselves new outlets whenever the Ottomans blocked their usual exits.

In any case, the present study emphasised that Köprülü Mehmed Pasha had two different fortifications built between 1660 and 1662, one on the Dnieper (Doğangeçidi) and the other on the banks of the Don River (Sedd-i İslam and the two towers). This means that even though he did not personally visit the northern edges of the

empire, Mehmed Pasha did not fail to take precautions against the dangers coming from beyond the Black Sea. These activities aimed at controlling the Dnieper and the Don, two important places where the Cossacks went out to banditry in the Black Sea, should be seen as part of Köprülü Mehmed's northern policy.

With the addition of the Sedd-i İslam Castle and the two towers of Şahi and Sultaniye, the aim was to reinforce the Azov Castle, turning the mouth of the Don into a network of fortifications. Even though the Crimean Khan seems to have played an active part in the construction and protection of this newly erected defence line, it was the Ottoman administrative centre that maintained the network there.

Doğangeçidi similarly became an outpost of Ottoman presence in the Dnieper, further upstream than the Oczakow fortress complex. However, it turned out to be a first step in the reinforcement of the Dnieper: in the period between 1660 and 1680, the Köprülü administration sought to extend the empire's fortifications around the Dnieper in order to use them as "strategical bases" for Ottoman (and Crimean) raids (Bagro 2015, p. 61). That is to say, apart from the Doğangeçidi, additional construction was carried out in 1679 (Dorogi and Hazai 2013, p. 310).

All these construction efforts should emphasise a perhaps slightly overlooked aspect of the Köprülü era: as much as the incumbencies of the consecutive Köprülü grand viziers was a time of territorial expansionism, it was also a period of retrenchment for the existing territories in the North. Considered in combination with the Köprülü Mehmed Pasha's building activities of military character in Western Anatolia (the Dardanelles and Izmir), Köprülü efforts had also this undeniably defensive aspect concomitant to their offensives into Europe.

NOTE

1. When we track Metin Kunt's related reference to Naima Tarihi (Naima 1863, p. 423), it is suggested that ships, material and troops were sent in 1660 to Özi (Oczakow) for the construction of a fortification; however, no name or completion date regarding the construction is indicated (Naima 1863, pp. 423 – 424). Nevertheless, Joseph von Hammer, the eminent Ottoman historian of the nineteenth century, could accurately identify the castles (one on the Dnieper and the other on the Don) (Hammer 1830, p. 86-88) and later authorities followed him (Jorga 1911, p. 106).
2. "Di Venezia, li 4 d' Agosto 1657". In: *Litterae Nuntiorum Apostolicorum Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantes (1550 – 1850)*. Vol. 9: 1657 – 1659, ed. Athanasius G. Welykyj, Basiliani, Rome 1963, p. 63 (hereafter *Litterae Nuntiorum*).
3. "7 Augusti 1657". In: Levinus Warner, *De Rebus Turcicis: Epistolae Ineditae*. Ed. by G. N. Du Rieu, Leiden: Brill., 1883, p. 38 (hereafter Warner 1883). Russian archival material from the specified year manifested that in early

- July 1657, Cossack vessels were spotted between Caffa and Kerch. They had incurred casualties among the Tatars wherefore it was ordered to arm the Tatars, Armenians and Jewish (Novosel'skiy 1994, p. 33).
4. "Adrianopoli 5 Agosto 1658". In: *Litterae Nuntiorum*, vol. 9, p. 133.
 5. "22 Augusti 1659". In: Warner 1883, p. 61.
 6. "30 Octobris 1660". In: Warner 1883, pp. 65 – 66.
 7. "H. Şaban 1071 [April 1661]". In: V. V. Velyaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına ve Ol Taraflarına Dair Bolgan Yarılgılar ve Hatlar*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2009, p. 536.
 8. In the seventh volume of his travelogue, Evliya Çelebi's description of the castle takes place after (Lunar Year) Recep 1076, suggesting it must be some time around Gregorian 1666.
 9. Evliya Çelebi calculates the length of the Sedd-i İslam walls around 350 extended steps (*germe adım*), whereas he suggested the Şahi tower's perimeter to be 150 steps (*adım*). The calculation of the perimeter is hence based on the equation of the 350 extended steps with Sedd-i İslam's actual peripheral length of 158 meters.
 10. "H. Evail-i Şevval 1071". In: Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387, f. 39r. At: Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek [SLUB] Dresden.
 11. "H. 6 Safer 1074": In: İE. ML. 16 – 1443. At: Presidency of the Turkish Republic, Directorate of the State Archives, Ottoman Archives [BOA]
 12. In: MAD.d 6616, p. 11. At: BOA. The register manifested that the order to send these necessities was issued on H. 29 Safer 1072 (24 October 1661).
 13. "H. Evail-i Receb 1071: 1 – 11 March 1661". In: Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387, f. 28r. At: SLUB Dresden.
 14. "H. Evail-i Şevval 1071: 30 May – 8 June 1661". In: Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387, f. 37r. At: SLUB. Dresden.
 15. In: MAD.d 6976, p. 5. At: BOA. The second rotation of *cebeciyan* soldiers around December 1661 increased this figure to 101, *ibidem*.
 16. "H. Evail-i Za 1071: 27 June – 7 July 1661". In: Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387, f. 41r. At: SLUB, Dresden.
 17. "H. Evail-i Za 1071: 27 June – 7 July 1661". In: Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387, f. 41 v. At: SLUB, Dresden.
 18. "H. Evasıt-ı Z 1071: 6 – 16 August 1661". In: Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387, f. 46 v. At: SLUB, Dresden.
 19. "H. Evail-i M 1072: 27 August – 6 September 1661." In: Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387, f. 47 r. At: SLUB, Dresden.
 20. "Varsavia, 18 October 1661". In: *Litterae Nuntiorum*, vol. 10, p. 200 – 201: The location of the Doğangeçidi was on the right hand side of the Dnieper, which could be regarded as the Polish side. The left hand side of the river was already guarded by Şahinkirmân, the Crimean outpost.

21. "Varsavia, 6 March 1662". In: *Litterae Nuntiorum*, vol. 10, p. 226.
22. "H. Evail-i R 1072: 23 Nov-3 December 1661". In: *Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387*, f. 54 r. At: SLUB, Dresden.
23. "Evahir-i Recep 1072: mid-March 1662". In: *Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387*, f. 61v. At: SLUB, Dresden.
24. It looks like the artillery personnel for the towers had already been sent as early as October 1661: "H. 22 Safer 1072: 17 October 1661". In: *KK.d 1955*, p. 11. At: BOA.
25. "Varsavia, 29 May 1662". In: *Litterae Nuntiorum*, vol. 10, p. 238.
26. "Evail-i Za 1072: 17 – 27 June 1662". In: *Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387*, f. 69r. At: SLUB, Dresden.
27. "Evasit-ı Safer 1073: 24 September – 4 October 1662". In: *Msc. Dresd. Eb. 387*, f. 79v. At: SLUB, Dresden.
28. In: *İE. AS. 4 – 363*. At: BOA. The payment covers the period between January 1666 (H. Receb 1076) and July 1666 (H. Zilhicce 1076).
29. "Vienna, 16 July 1661". In: *Litterae Nuntiorum*, vol. 10, pp. 190 – 191. "Andrianopoli [Edirne], 6 October 1661". In: *Litterae Nuntiorum*, vol. 10, pp. 197 – 198.
30. "H. Evasit-ı M 1074: 14-24 August 1663". In: Karaca 2008, p. 93: all the local authorities from Istanbul to Trabzon were admonished to prepare for the Cossack raids, who had reputedly descended into the Black Sea.
31. "29 March 1663". In: Warner 1883, p. 88.

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