Plamen Chergarov
University of Sofia
https://doi.org/10.53656/nat2023-2.04
Abstract. Mental models are a representation of the external world. They are a hypothetical example of relevant elements to the knowing subject, that are configured by analogy to the world`s being. The formation of warranted beliefs can be a result of the very same reliability of this type of representation. The article argues for this position and defends the thesis that the world is epistemically insecure. This means that there is no objective reason in and of itself for certain elements to be preferred rather than other. This is a serious problem for AI researchers, who find difficulty in recreating the visual orientation ability of humans. By this analogy, mental models have high value in orienting us in the epistemic landscape. This article argues that mental models have higher epistemic value compared to AI.
Keywords: mental model; epistemic insecurity; artificial intelligence; reliability
