Dr. Juraj Odorčák
University of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava (Slovakia)
https://doi.org/10.53656/phil2021-04-04
Abstract. The article presents a critique of the commonly held assumption about the practical advantage of endurantism over perdurantism regarding the problem of future-directed self-concern of a person. The future-directed self-concern of a person crucially depends on the possibility of the right differentiation of diverging futures of distinct persons, therefore any theory of persistence that does not entail a special non-branching relation of a person to only their future self seems to be counterintuitive or unrealistic for practical purposes of personal persistence. I argue that this pragmatic rationale about future-directed self-concern is equally challenging for both theories of persistence. Moreover, I indicate, that both of these theories fall and stand on the practical feasibility of hidden ontological presuppositions about specific second-order notions of concerns of persons for their future.
Keywords: personal survival; self-concern; future self; perdurantism; endurantism; ontology
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