Theory of Cognition and Practical Interest in Kant: on the Distinction Between Appearance and Thing in Itslef

Aliki Lavranu
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences

https://doi.org/10.53656/phil2024-02-03

Abstract. The article examines the significance of the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves for the foundation of Kantian practical reason. It holds that this distinction acquires its full meaning and the entire gamut of its validity only in the sphere of practical reason. In this way, it attempts to show that the Kantian epistemological distinctions and the fundamental steps in the construction of the Critique of Pure Reason are at the same time strategies to support practical reason, thus driven by an emphatically “practical interest”.
Keywords: Kant, theory of cognition, practical interest, critical metaphysics

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